Recharging relations- India Afghan Relations

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s first visit to India is part of his effort to win the support of immediate neighbours to stave off the military challenge posed by the Taliban.

Ashraf Ghani came to New Delhi in the last week of April on his first visit to India after taking over as the President of Afghanistan more than seven months ago. His predecessor Hamid Karzai had nurtured close ties with India, much to the chagrin of Pakistan. Ghani, on the other hand, seems intent on charting a different path for his country taking into account the ground realities in the region. Unlike Karzai, Ghani has been reluctant to get into a tight embrace with New Delhi.

During the hotly contested presidential election in 2014, India’s preferred candidate was Abdullah Abdullah, a fact that may have no doubt riled Ghani. The two signed a power-sharing agreement under which Ghani was made President and Abdullah, who reluctantly conceded defeat, was designated as the Chief Executive Officer. The political cohabitation, brokered by the United States, continues to be uneasy. In recent months, Ghani has emerged as the man calling the shots in the government.

With the bulk of the U.S. troops exiting Afghanistan in December last year, Ghani has realised that he needs the support of his immediate neighbours to stave off the military challenge posed by the Taliban. The President postponed his visit to India by a day because the Taliban had launched an offensive in Kunduz. The annual fighting season in the country has started with the winter coming to an end. The emergence of the Islamic State (I.S.) in Afghanistan has further complicated the security situation. Counter insurgency experts agree that the I.S. has become active in some parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, having managed to attract Taliban fighters and a few tribal leaders on both sides of the border. Indian intelligence agencies have conceded that the rise of the I.S. in the region poses a threat to the country’s security.

China’s plans

China was the first country Ghani visited after assuming office, signalling the priority his government was giving to ties with Beijing. In fact, it is for the first time that China is playing an important role in the ongoing efforts to broker peace between the government in Kabul and the Taliban. China is investing heavily in its efforts to ensure a comparatively peaceful political transition in Kabul after the U.S. troops finally leave Afghan soil. Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the primary objective of China. The recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan was illustrative of the importance it is giving to the region. During his visit, Xi laid the foundations of the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor Project, which will allow China to directly transport goods from West Asia through a more secure and shorter land route. The Chinese government has pledged to invest $46 billion for developing the infrastructure for the project and implementing it. A 3,000-kilometre network of pipelines, roads and railways will link the Pakistani port of Gwadar to western China. Pakistan has now become a key component of China’s ambitious “new silk road” initiative. The investment pledged by China is by far the biggest Pakistan has received so far. It surpasses the $31 billion Pakistan has received from the U.S., its long-standing ally, since the latter began its “war on terror” in 2002. Most of the U.S. money, around 70 per cent, was earmarked for the Pakistan Army to ensure its commitment to U.S. policies in the region, including drone attacks on the civilian populace in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China does not want Islamic radicalism to spill over to its territory from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Uighur extremists are known to be active along the Afghan-Pakistan border. In recent years, there has been a surge in terror attacks in the Uighur dominated region of Xinjiang. China is using its considerable influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fast-track talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. According to reports, Beijing recently hosted a Taliban delegation. The Barack Obama administration is also not averse to the idea of talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. After all, it had tried to do the same last year. The Taliban was given quasi-diplomatic status in Doha, Qatar, where it continues to function openly. The international community, barring a few holdouts like India, now believes in differentiating between the “good Taliban” and the “bad Taliban”. Sections of the “bad Taliban” seem to be now metamorphosing into the I.S.

After his trip to Beijing, Ghani visited Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the U.S. and Iran. His visit to Pakistan seems to have resulted in a sea change in bilateral relations. The adversarial nature of the relations, during the Karzai era, now seems to be a thing of the past. During the visit, Ghani praised the Pakistan Army’s counterterrorism efforts. He took the unprecedented step of visiting its headquarters in Rawalpindi where he held talks with the Army chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif. Afghanistan’s decision to not avail itself of India’s offer to supply heavy weapons has been appreciated in Pakistan.

In his speech at the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Kathmandu, Ghani said that his country should not be used as a stage for proxy wars between regional powers. For the first time, Afghan Army officers are being sent to Pakistani military institutions for training. According to reports, Pakistani officials are now allowed to interrogate suspected terrorists in Afghan jails. Unlike his predecessor, Ghani is not accusing Pakistan of supporting crossborder terrorism. His priority is to get the Taliban to the negotiating table. He knows that the Pakistani intelligence services are capable of persuading important sections of the Taliban to start talks.

The Taliban has been saying for some time now that it is amenable to talks, but only after all the foreign troops have left Afghanistan. Ghani is aware that the Afghan Army is not in a position to defend the country on its own as yet though it has been doing much of the fighting since the beginning of the year. During his visit to Washington in March, Ghani urged the U.S. government to keep some of its troops in Afghanistan, citing the threat posed by the I.S. as one of the reasons for his request. At present, there are around 10,000 U.S. troops. By the end of the year, their numbers are supposed to be halved.

India, a major donor

It is not that the U.S. needs much encouragement to stay on. It was Karzai’s reluctance to sign a Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. that led to tensions with the Obama administration. Almost immediately after taking office, Ghani signed an agreement with the U.S. for stationing a small contingent of U.S. troops beyond 2015. The U.S. has been continuing with its air assaults on Taliban targets. According to a recent report in The New York Times, the top U.S. Army commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, justified the targeting of Taliban fighters posing a threat to either U.S. or Afghan troops. According to the report, Gen. Campbell meets Ghani every day and he “has in many ways outsourced much of the running of the war to General Campbell”. Afghanistan has been without a Minister of Defence since Ghani took over the presidency.

In New Delhi, Ghani reaffirmed his commitment to the strategic agreement signed between the two countries in 2011, though there were no new announcements on the steps being taken to strengthen it. India did hand over three helicopters to

Afghanistan before Ghani arrived. He emphasised the need for regional cooperation in fighting terrorism. He thanked the Indian government for its continuing support and aid to Afghanistan. India is among the major international donors to Afghanistan, having contributed over $2 billion. The joint statement released during the visit reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments “to the full implementation of the strategic partnership objectives”. Ghani invited Indian companies to invest in Afghanistan. “We see the Indian private sector as a key partner in transforming Afghanistan from an area shadowed by conflict to a hub—where goods, ideas, people flow in all directions,” Ghani told Indian businessmen in New Delhi. He said his country was blessed with significant mineral deposits, including lithium and oil. Indian industry was also urged to invest in the hydroelectric and petrochemical sectors, which Ghani said had a big potential.

China has invested heavily in the exploitation of copper mines in Afghanistan and has emerged as the top investor in the country.

The Afghan leader said he would insist that Pakistan allow the transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan. Only Afghan goods are allowed to be trucked up to the Wagah border crossing on the Pakistani side of the border with India. Ghani said that if Pakistan did not relent on the issue, his government would stop the transit of Pakistani exports to Central Asia passing through Afghan territory. There is a lot of goodwill for India among ordinary Afghans. India’s “soft power” diplomacy will continue to pay dividends.

It has expended its $2 billion in aid on the construction of hospitals, schools and roads and institution building. Every government in Kabul since the 1950s invariably had problems with Islamabad in the long run. Pakistan has a tendency to view Afghanistan as its backyard and has tended to interfere in its domestic affairs. Then there is the question of the border. Many Afghans still refuse to accept the “Durand Line” demarcated by the British in the 19th century as the boundary between the two countries.

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‘Preparedness is central to the plan’- Disaster Management

India’s role in helping the Nepal government in its relief efforts in the aftermath of the deadly earthquake has come in for a lot of praise. The most important reason for this is the promptness shown by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in handling the emergency well. The NDMA’s work shows that India’s disaster management abilities have evolved much since the 2004 tsunami. Still, experts believe that disaster mitigation and prevention measures already taken are far from satisfactory. Lieutenant-General N.C. Marwah, NDMA member, talks to Frontline about how disaster management functions in the country and explains how it can be improved:

The NDMA’s role in the earthquake relief efforts in Nepal has been widely acclaimed. How prepared is India in the event of a disaster of this scale in near future?

We must understand how the NDMA and the whole disaster management work in India. The NDMA came into being after the National Disaster Management Act of 2005. The Act has comprehensive and elaborate guidelines for all types of disasters. It lays down the responsibilities of government agencies at various levels. The disaster management plan not only means responding to a disaster; it also means mitigation of risks. The NDMA is only a part  of India’s disaster management plans. It focusses on the immediate response to a disaster.

The Act says that all States should have their own disaster management plan. The NDMA, from time to time, recommends fresh disaster management measures for them. Likewise, the States have a district management plan. We have identified five most vulnerable zones with regard to earthquakes and work closely with the States. Risk reduction measures must be central to disaster management planning. We have to think of it when we plan mega-infrastructure or even normal buildings. Various laws and standards have been laid down for infrastructure projects. The States, municipalities and

government agencies are responsible for their implementation. New buildings should conform to new disaster guidelines. It is obvious that disaster management requires a great deal of coordination between the NDMA and various government agencies, with roles cut out for each leg of the plan.

Yes, the Act mentions responsibilities for each level of governance. Disaster preparedness should be a priority. But before everything, the communities in vulnerable zones should be aware about risk-mitigating programmes as they are the first respondents to a disaster. Before the local fire stations, paramilitary forces, NDRF [National Disaster Response Force] elements, home guards, before any official agency. Awareness drives are being undertaken at various levels, sponsored by the Centre and the State governments.

What about mock drills?

Mock exercises touch on all aspects of disaster management—awareness and sensitisation of all the stakeholders and all the governments and non-government agencies that are involved. The NDMA has conducted a total of 486 exercises in various

States with the help of the State governments; of these, 166 focussed on earthquakes in vulnerable zones. Mock exercises include drawing up a plan, ensuring participation of all stakeholders, and drilling it out with them by assuming a disaster situation. We have undertaken three mega mock exercises—in Shillong and Mandi, and on the Bihar-Nepal border. These are high risk zones. These mega exercises went on for a period of time and included awareness drives in schools, hospitals, blocks and panchayats. A drill in the National Capital Region assumed an earthquake with its epicentre at Moradabad in Uttar Pradesh.

The States also have disaster management plans. How do they work with the NDMA?

The State Disaster Management Authority is directly under the supervision of the Chief Minister just as the NDMA is under the Prime Minister. The SDMA should have its own State Disaster Relief Force [SDRF]. We work very closely with each other during disasters. However, most States don’t have a dedicated disaster response force. The States have trained certain units of their police machinery to respond to emergency situations. Battalions in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have been trained in flood management because of the concern over floods. We at the NDMA also have a dedicated team that aims at awareness and capacity building. We train many such battalions. We also train the NDRF commanding officers. And we are aiming at conducting 50 mock exercises in the near future. The NDMA’s role is one of cooperation with the States. The funds fo disaster management now are directly routed to the States through the Finance Commission and not through the NDMA. Municipalities and other such agencies are controlled by the State. We facilitate and help them in undertaking various capacity-building measures.

Experts have felt that while India’s disaster response has evolved into a good system in the post-tsunami period, mitigation and preventive aspects are still inadequate. What do you think are critical concerns as far as disaster management in India is concerned?

Our concerns pertain to the implementation of the plan. After the Nepal earthquake, the overriding concerns across regions is whether the structures people are residing in and working from are safe. What happens if something like Nepal happens here? Particularly in the metros? The parties concerned need to ensure that building rules are followed and implemented. Two days after the Nepal earthquake, newspapers talked about NCR people organising a rapid visual survey [RPS], roping in qualified engineers and architects to inspect high-rises to assess whether they are safe. The rapid visual survey involves identifying vulnerable buildings and then strengthening them to make them earthquake resistant. So the priority right from the State level to the municipality level should be to undertake these surveys and take measures to undertake retro-fitting and, of course, ensure that new structures conform to building norms.

Secondly, we need to have intensive awareness programmes in these vulnerable areas, leading on to capacity building of communities residing there. For capacity building we train civil defence teams in handling disasters. We have already initiated a dialogue with the National Cadet Corps [NCC]. Our teams train NCC boys and girls in their camps. Since the NDMA’s reach is limited, such programmes help us reach much larger audiences. We also train a large number of NGOs [non-governmental organisations].

Do you think the disaster management plan is adequate in handling all disasters effectively?

The structure is fine, but more qualitative interaction between different agencies is  needed. All government agencies should work together.

The role of the NDRF has been widely acclaimed in the last few disasters. How big is the NDRF?

The NDRF today has 10 battalions, and the present government has sanctioned two additional battalions. So we should have 12 battalions, and each unit has about 1,200 people. They are highly trained and equipped with specialised and sophisticated machinery. We often collaborate with international disaster response forces. Our focus is to energise the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Coperation] centre for disaster management in India so that all South Asian countries can cooperate actively in case of a disaster.

The NDRF’s role is acclaimed because of the promptness shown by all departments of the NDMA. The NDMA already has a control room that functions 24X7. In the case of Nepal, we immediately beefed up our staff over here. The Secretary attended a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister. Thereafter the meetings were chaired by Cabinet Secretaries. The NDRF teams are supposed to be ready on a half-an-hour notice. We are happy that our NDRF teams with two or three tonnes of relief materials and essential items to carry were airborne towards Nepal within two hours of the disaster striking. This means they were ready in less than 30 minutes.

Do you believe that environmental violation and indiscriminate industrialisation have led to greater risks of natural disasters?

Yes, these factors are there, but these are the issues that are being specifically dealt with the Ministry of Environment and Forests.

Greater sensitisation about environmental regulations may act as a preventive measure.

Yes. Definitely. When we interact with States, we apprise them of all these issues. The NDMA plays a very active role in engaging with many Ministries too. Environmental issues like violation of Coastal Regulation Zone rules need to be fixed,

and we are aware of that.

The general notion is that when a disaster happens, the NDMA is the only institution answerable. But the NDMA’s focus is disaster response.

You’ve asked a valid question. The buck stops at the National Crisis Management Group [NCMG] under the Act. The chairman of the NCMG is the Cabinet Secretary and there are representatives from all the Ministries in it. The NDMA Secretary is also a part of the group. The Ministry of Home Affairs becomes the nodal Ministry for the response mechanism in case of a disaster.

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‘Expose U.S. hypocrisy in WTO talks’- Interview with Deborah James

DEBORAH JAMES IS A LEADING VOICE IN THE fight for just rules in the global trade order. She is the director of International Programmes at the Centre for Economic and Policy Research, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank that was founded in 1999 as part of the alter-globalisation movement. Deborah James had previously worked at Global Exchange, where she was an expert in the unfair trade policies that emerged out of the “globalisation” era of the 1990s. As the director of the World Trade Organisation Programme at Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, she participated in the debates leading up to the WTO’s Doha Round, which began in 2001. Deborah James also served as the first executive director of the Venezuela Information Office in Washington, D.C., an organisation that sought to intervene in the public debate on the progressive social transformation under way in Venezuela. In this interview, Deborah James spoke about the ongoing tussle in the WTO around the question of food security. This debate is germane to India, whose government played a role at the last WTO meeting. Excerpts:

Currently, there is an open-ended negotiation on global food security that must produce some kind of consensus for the WTO by December 2015. What divides the WTO member states over the idea of food security?

The WTO has a myopic focus of merely increasing trade. There are many downsides to holding a discussion on food security at the WTO as a result. It would be better to hold these negotiations in the Committee on Food Security at the Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO], which has a better track record of being sensitive to the need to guarantee food security. No member is proposing to take the WTO out of the discussion on agriculture, however. There are many who argue that to remove agriculture from the WTO would only make global agricultural trade much more unfair.

The problem is that it is the WTO, not the FAO, which regulates agriculture and trade. Thus, WTO obstacles to food security must be removed. Developing countries should be allowed to invest in their own agricultural production and feed their own populations. This would allow these countries to no longer be dependent on global food aid. Public stockholdings for food security should be welcomed, as should protection for markets against import surges through a workable special safeguard mechanism. Countries that subsidise agriculture, as many developed countries do, should not be able to export that food at subsidised prices because it competes unfairly with local farmers and prices them out of their own markets, diminishing local production in the long run.

The process under way should revise WTO rules in line with the global consensus on agricultural investment and food security. Millennium Development Goal no. 1 called for the eradication of poverty and hunger. The current rules at the WTO work against this goal. They need to be revised urgently.

You talk of the “global consensus on food security”. Could you elaborate on this?

Every international body that deals with agriculture has come to recognise the need to prioritise food security over simply promoting trade. While the original Rome Declaration on Food Security in 1996 emphasised ensuring food security through market-based mechanisms, the 2009 World Summit on Food Security placed emphasis instead on national investments in agriculture. The African Union announced in the “Maputo Declaration” in 2004 the commitment by each country to invest 10 per cent of national budgets in agricultural production; 2014 was the African Union’s Year of Food Security. Olivier de Schutter, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has detailed how WTO policies are incompatible with the right to food. He wrote a paper on this, which caused a massive uproar at the WTO [de Schutter’s 2011 paper is entitled “The World Trade Organisation and the Post-Global Food Crisis Agenda: Putting Food Security First in the International Trade System”]. De Schutter highlighted the importance of developing countries maintaining food reserves, as well as the importance of protecting their markets from international market volatility.

The policies that people like de Schutter talk about amount to subsidy regimes and other kinds of protective measures. Does not the United States, which is opposed to such regimes, have a subsidy regime in place for its domestic food production?

Yes, this is the case. The U.S. is the world’s largest agriculture subsidiser. In 2011, it spent over $139 billion for domestic support, double the subsidy paid out in 1995. Most of this is for food stamps for the poor, something similar to the public distribution system in India. But $15 billion of this was for overtly trade-distorting support. The European Union [E.U.] also provides domestic support—to the tune of $79 billion in 2013.

No wonder that the U.S. is often taken to the WTO on charges that its farm subsidies distort the level playing field. It has lost many of these cases. U.S. cotton subsidies alone have so depressed global cotton prices that Brazil has twice won WTO cases against the U.S. But rather than change the subsidies, the U.S. pays off Brazil to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Sadly, this leaves less politically powerful small farmers in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali in the dust. In 2013, despite having its own domestic food security provisions, the U.S. blocked negotiations in the WTO. It specifically argued that India was trying to “roll back commitments” or that its distribution of poor farmers’ produce to poor citizens

would somehow distort global markets.

Could you explain how the U.S. and the E.U. get away with their subsidy regimes?

First, the WTO rules allow countries that had subsidy regimes before 1994 to continue these polices, with the idea of reducing them over time. At the time of the inception of the WTO, almost all the countries that were engaging in subsidies were developed countries. Over 100 developing country members are not allowed these subsidies. Ten years ago, the U.S. and the Europeans agreed to phase out the tens of billions of dollars -worth of legal subsidies. They have not lived up to their bargain. Second, even with all this latitude, they do get fined, which they prefer to pay off rather than participate to change the rules for the benefit of all countries.

There is one more problem, which relates to the “reference price”. To calculate the “trade-distorting” subsidies, countries have to figure out the difference between the minimum support prices [MSP] and the WTO “reference price,” which is the average world price from 1986 to 1988. The WTO prefers to use this archaic method rather than calculate the difference between the MSP and the current market prices. Since developing countries have experienced terrible inflation, the gap between the MSP and the WTO “reference price” is ludicrously high. India’s Ambassador to the WTO, Jayant Dasgupta, has been a vocal critic of this “reference price” system. It disadvantages developing countries. Developed countries, by the way, don’t have to use this system because their food security programmes are considered “non-trade-distorting” by the WTO rules.

Could you describe what happened regarding food security at the WTO meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013?

The Bali meeting was very contentious. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food again called for developing countries to be granted the freedom to use food reserves to help secure the right to food without the threat of sanctions by the WTO. He said that states that must provide food security polices should not have to “tiptoe around WTO rules”. Indian farmers, I recall, wanted the Indian government to hold fast. This pushed India to lead the food security coalition in the WTO, which fought a hard battle against U.S. intransigence.

No final agreement was reached, only a commitment to further negotiations. The WTO members gave themselves four years to reach a settlement. The interim agreement was what was called a peace clause. It came with concessions to developed countries in the guise of a Trade Facilitation Agreement, which would force developing states to put resources towards making trade easier rather than health care and education. Transnational shipping and logistical corporations won out over “development”. This was called the Bali Package.

Could you elaborate upon the peace clause?

Under the peace clause, countries that have existing subsidy programmes cannot be subject to legal cases by other WTO members if they comply with onerous reporting requirements and prove that their subsidies do not distort markets. By the way, the U.S. does not need to follow these requirements. No new programmes may be implemented, and there was no guarantee that a permanent solution would be agreed on the end of the four years. However, there was a wrinkle. Legal ambiguity in the text meant that it was not clear whether the peace clause would be in effect until a permanent solution was agreed on, or only for four years—and would then expire. Thus, when the new Government of India came to office last spring, they requested a clarification that the peace clause would be in effect until a permanent change in the rules was agreed on. Again, the U.S. refused to make this clarification, demonstrating that indeed it had been planning on allowing the peace clause to expire without a new deal in place.

India then countered that it would not let the other aspects of the Bali Package come into effect until it had received this simple clarification. And while the U.S. spent the summer blaming India for supposedly scuttling the Bali Package, it refused to make the clarification. Indian farmers and Indian Left parties, supported by global civil society, kept the pressure on their government. Months dragged on. U.S. corporations didn’t want their trade facilitation deal imperilled. Because of the trade facilitation gift, the U.S. agreed to allow the peace clause to remain in place until a permanent solution is agreed upon. WTO members agreed to make “all concerted efforts” to find a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security by the last day of 2015. They moved up the date for the expiration of the peace clause by two years. This means that the decision would have to come out of the upcoming WTO ministerial meeting to be held in Nairobi, Kenya, from December 15 to 18 of this year.

Thus, there is a short window of time in which to expose U.S. hypocrisy in the negotiations and work to build global pressure to ensure that the most damaging rule in the WTO can be brought into line with the global consensus in favour of developing countries engaging in the global best practice of strategic food reserves, for the benefit of farmers’ livelihoods, rural development and the right to food.

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United on border - India Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement

Former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee once commented: “You can change friends but not neighbours.” Divine dispensation, geography and a tortuously shared history destined India and Bangladesh to be neighbours. Just as in a community, quarrelsome neighbours sharing the same geopolitical landscape do not lend to good neighbourly relations or peace in their neighbourhood. The irony is that having coexisted peacefully and harmoniously within what for millennia was known as the Indian subcontinent, a few centuries of colonial rule by “gora sahibs” from distant shores transformed these peoples into each other’s sworn enemies. When the colonial masters realised that their much touted jewel in the imperial crown had become a millstone around their war ravaged neck, they gave in to the increasingly strident demands for independence by their subjects and quit these shores, only after presiding over the partition of this once united domain into three entities, India and West and East Pakistan. The two wings of the newly created Pakistan, separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory, unnaturally configured as they were when torn apart in August 1947 from the mainland of which they had historically been an integral part, could not have remained together in an everlasting union.

So, after a bloody nine month War of Liberation in 1971, the Bengalis of East Pakistan divorced the West Pakistani partner to set up house independently as Bangladesh. However, the issue of the contentious boundaries between them remained and continued to fester. After Independence in August 1947, under the Radcliffe Award which divided the subcontinent, India shared its longest land border of 4,096 kilometres not with West Pakistan or China but with what emerged as East Pakistan. This was a tortuously complex border that cut mercilessly across communities that had coexisted for centuries, and indeed even households that had been one the night before.

Apart from the sheer length of the border, some cutting across rivers, the division also unwittingly spawned some strange creatures:

(1) enclaves of one country within the newly constituted national boundaries of the other (East Pakistani enclaves surrounded on all sides by Indian territory, and vice versa), in which the inhabitants were notionally citizens of the new countries to whom the land belonged, but totally isolated by virtue of their location, as the new country to which they found themselves belonging by virtue of Partition could not reach governance or services to their notional citizens while the national entities, which now found themselves saddled with these enclaves, refused to acknowledge these people as their own; and (2) adversely possessed lands (lands in possession of one or the other newly carved national entities which, under the award, were arbitrarily endowed to the other side, whether deliberately or inadvertently because the pen drawing the line on the map had a thick nib).

Just as in a housing development area land allocated to buyers has to be demarcated through a survey that formally marks the coordinates and perimeters that bound that piece of land, the partitioned subcontinent also required such boundary demarcation to take place, to formalize the principles of division that Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the person entrusted by the Crown in London to draw the lines across the map, in his wisdom had awarded to the reconstituted entities that emerged. Post Partition efforts at demarcation under the Firoz Khan Noon Jawaharlal Nehru accord of 1958 were unable to resolve these festering issues. Although border demarcation work proceeded with the Surveyors General of the two new national entities carrying on demarcation as per the Radcliffe Award, the strip maps (the entire length of the new borders was divided into manageable strips to make the survey work easier) continued to remain “unformalised”, with the plenipotentiaries of the two sides not signing on to them, whether deliberately or through mala fide “oversight”. It may be noted that not getting the plenipotentiaries to countersign the strip maps agreed upon by the respective Surveyors General left a dangerous situation for mischief because either side at any given point of time could contest that the demarcation in one or more strips had been inaccurately done. (Indeed, such a situation did arise in mid1995 but was contained before it escalated.)

So when Vajpayee enunciated this maxim, he was simply pointing to the practical necessity of arriving at a reasonable understanding with India’s immediate neighbours so that all sides could move away from debilitating distractions of managing contested borders and focus single mindedly on development and the uplift of their teeming populations out of the morass of poverty that plagued the entire region. While India’s relations with Pakistan continued to remain star crossed, the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 presented an opportunity to get the relations with at least one neighbour right. Prime Ministers Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indira Gandhi, of Bangladesh and India respectively, entered into a Land Boundary Agreement on May 16, 1974. That agreement laid down the principles of demarcating the borders that the Radcliffe Award had bequeathed to the two sides. The brutal assassination of Mujibur Rahman along with almost his entire family and some of his most trusted lieutenants and colleagues on August 15, 1975, effectively stalled further efforts to bring the issue to closure. Relations between India and Bangladesh became subject to mood swings depending on who was in power in Bangladesh. As a general rule, democratic India got on better with the Awami League (the party founded by Mujibur Rahman) which had spearheaded the Liberation Movement in East Pakistan, while relations with other, more authoritarian minded, parties/forces in power tended to be indifferent at best.

While some progress was made in improving relations with the Awami League, which headed a coalition government in 1996 after having remained in the wilderness for almost 18 years (the Ganges Treaty and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, which ended the insurgency there, were arrived at in December 1996 and in 1997 respectively), the two governments were unable to move significantly forward on other, more challenging, issues because of the weak nature of the coalition dispensations obtaining on both sides then.

Relations between the two countries deteriorated significantly during 2001-06 when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power in Bangladesh. However, a fresh opportunity presented itself when Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League were reelected to power with a huge mandate in December 2008. The two countries immediately began to engage earnestly to resolve the festering bilateral problem. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited India in January 2010, a game changing visit when both neighbours turned a critically important corner in defining normatively what their relations should be. The Joint Communique issued on January 10, 2010, was a remarkable document in that it clearly laid out the road map the two countries would follow to set right all the issues that had for long been bothering them, including the boundary issue inherited under the Radcliffe Award. After painstaking negotiations for a comprehensive package deal, on September 7, 2011, during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the two sides signed a Protocol to the 1974 agreement.

The Bangladesh Parliament ratified the agreement almost immediately, but the process was stalled as a progressively weakening coalition government in India was unable to push through the complex ratification process in the Indian Parliament. As India inched towards the next parliamentary elections in 2014, completion of the ratification process by the Congressl ed United Progressive Alliance-II government receded progressively. It was, therefore, perhaps not entirely inappropriate that it was left to those who inherited the mantle of Vajpayee to assume the task of completing what the Congress led government had started. The unanimity with which the Rajya Sabha (on May 6) and the Lok Sabha (on May 7) approved the Constitution (100th Amendment) Bill, operationalizing the Bangladesh India Land Boundary Agreement, 1974, and the 2011 Protocol, was a historic, game changing development in the tortuous post Partition annals of this fragmented subcontinent. It imparts to the historic accord the strongest foundations upon which to build any magnificent edifice that leaders and peoples on both sides can dare to dream. It testifies to the singular visionary statesmanship of the Prime Minster of India that he saw it fit to overrule narrower political calculations that had been contemplated mercifully very fleetingly for the larger common good of all peoples. It also put to rest the malevolent daemons that had been unleashed by the Radcliffe Award.

The entire process was by no means easy, as various local conflicting interests and sometimes viscerally antagonistic opposition at different levels had to be dealt with, pacified and won over. One must congratulate the various field officials on both sides who carried out the job entrusted to them by the leadership of the two sides. That they had clear instructions on how they should address the resolution process was of critical importance. Whenever difficulties were encountered, the officials were given full support and backing and clear instructions by the chain of command at all levels as was required. Without all this coming together, this stupendous task would not have been fulfilled. But, above all, it has to be recognised that without the visionary leadership on both sides that eschewed narrower political considerations in the interest of the larger common good, this would not have been possible.

Space for mutual comfort

Historically, undemarcated international borders have been known to spawn or aggravate other areas of dispute. Conversely, resolution of such contestations helps restore harmony. The resolution of this border dispute has, according to first reports, been welcomed by a vast majority of the peoples on both sides, irrespective of internal political divisions. It has already widened the space of mutual comfort and mutual trust that are essential prerequisites for cooperation and collaboration in any activity. The two countries can now focus on achieving the other broader and far reaching goals they had set for themselves in the Framework Agreement for Cooperation signed on September 7, 2011. Among other things, that remarkable document envisaged broader sub regional cooperation between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (to begin with) on a wide range of areas/sectors. While the process commenced in 2012, it was tentative and hesitant, with non-completion of agreements already arrived at. One may expect to see more determined and reinvigorated forward movement on a broad range of new initiatives that embrace common river basin management, trade and connectivity expansion, joint or sole investments in important projects and medium and long term energy security without which the new industrial revolution in this region cannot happen.

A more humane border management that will enable both sides to control illegal cross border activities and encourage legal, mutually beneficial movements is expected. In a sense, this is the first, and most important, prerequisite for moving towards an economically integrated region.

On another, perhaps more significant level, this resolution stands out as an exemplar of visionary statesmanship, common sense and pragmatism that deserves closer scrutiny and emulation by others. It sends out a clear signal to others in the region that intractable issues bedevilling bilateral relations can be resolved if addressed with sincerity, pragmatism, good sense and firm political will, keeping in mind the greater common good of all peoples concerned.

Tariq A. Karim is a former High Commissioner of Bangladesh to India.

Destructive decisions - Modi Government on Environment Front

IN its first year, Narendra Modi’s government has been true to form, proving right apprehensions that environmental concerns will not be on its agenda. Indications of this position on the environment came early in the day. After taking office, Prakash Javadekar, the Minister in charge of the newly named Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC), referred to the stringent environmental clearance processes put in place by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government as “roadblocks” and “speed breakers” that caused “loss of face” to the nation. He promised swifter resolution of issues and made the now famous statement:

“Decisions are in. Delays are out.” He chalked out a ready reckoner time frame of two months for environmental clearances. And true to his word, he cleared 240 projects in the first three months (including raising the height of the Sardar Sarovar Dam), leading the environmentalist Ashish Kothari to call it the Ministry for Ensuring Fast Corporate Clearances.

It is deeply ironical that the portfolio of climate change has only now been added to the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Who can forget Modi’s infamous words: “Climate change? Is this terminology correct? The reality is that in our family some people are old and they say the weather is colder… and people’s ability to bear cold becomes less.” His indifference to environmental issues was also on display when he refused to attend the United Nations’ Special Summit on Climate Change. Further proof that the Ministry is inconsequential—in the government’s very first Budget, its allocation for 201415 was cut by more than 50 per cent.

Javadekar’s promise of quick decisions reeks of poor understanding. An environment impact assessment (EIA), which is part of the environment clearance process, takes a minimum of one year to complete as the site in question is observed through all seasons. How, then, can clearances be given in two months? Perhaps, he was just sticking to his party’s election manifesto, which promised to “frame the environment laws in a manner that provides no scope for confusion and will lead to speedy clearance of proposals without delay”.

For the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), it is fashionable to blame environmental laws for poor economic growth. In February, Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said growth rates had “radically gone down” under the previous government owing to delayed project approvals. But while it is trendy to say this, it is factually incorrect.

The Economic Survey 2014-15 says: “It is clear that private projects are held up overwhelmingly due to market conditions and non-regulatory factors… Perhaps contrary to popular belief, the evidence points towards over exuberance and a credit bubble as primary reasons (rather than lack of regulatory clearances) for stalled projects in the private sector.”

When faced with irrefutable, data based logic, the BJP turns economic growth into a subject of nationalist pride, where to question growth at any cost or to be proenvironment

is to automatically be branded antinational. This is what happened to Greenpeace when

the organisation was barred from receiving foreign funds and its licence suspended in April under the allegation that it had “prejudicially” affected the country’s economic interests.

The same thinking was apparently being applied when the BJP decided to decimate the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL). Independent experts were removed (thereby flouting a requirement of the Wildlife Protection Act) and replaced with retired forest officials nominated by the government. The new board tried to push through a 22kilometre canal of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project and a road through the wild ass sanctuary in Kutch district, both in Gujarat. Simultaneously, the government made it easier for projects within 10 km of sanctuaries to get clearances by ensuring that such applications were made to the NBWL and not the State wildlife boards. With the newly constituted NBWL, the probability of these projects getting “cleared” is high.

The Forest Conservation Act is also being decimated for the benefit of mining and other industries. The criteria for deciding the use of forest land are being eroded, making it easier to exploit it for non-forest purposes. Under the guise of national security and growth, even more forest areas are being opened up. Felling of trees is allowed for infrastructure projects and the status of eco-sensitive zones becomes secondary along the Line of Control and in so called naxal areas.

Since May 2014, when the BJP came to power, the MoEFCC has been gnawing away at existing laws to shape them into instruments that can be used for expediting economic growth at the cost of the environment and human rights. In June 2014, the Ministry amended its EIA notification of 2006 to exempt irrigation projects from environmental clearances. This means that the projects do not require the seeking of permission from the people who will be affected by them. Furthermore, State governments have been allowed to clear similar projects affecting areas up to 10,000 hectares, with Ministry clearance needed only for projects affecting larger areas.

The Forest Rights Act, 2006, is also in the BJP’s sights. The Act requires that gram sabhas give prior informed consent to projects coming up in their areas. With increased awareness, especially in the coal belt, gram sabhas are wary of allowing industries in. In July 2014, the MoEFCC, in an effort to bypass gram sabhas, said documentary evidence of settlement of claims would no longer be required for proposals relating to prospecting in forest land. And in October, the Ministry said that in cases where the recent Census did not show the presence of tribal communities, gram sabha consent would not be required for forest land to be used for non-forest purposes.

The conflict between coal and the environment is an old one. After the 2012 mining scam expose, certain amendments became law. Unfortunately, while the business end of things was looked into, the environmental and human rights aspects were not. memorandums issued in May and June stated that existing mines with an annual production capacity of less than 16 million tonnes were exempt from conducting public hearings with project affected communities before expansion. And mines that were already at this capacity could ramp up their production to an extra six million tonnes a year.

Coal is found in heavily forested areas and mining it destroys the forest and its denizens. A 2012 Greenpeace report titled “How Coal Mining is Trashing Tigerland” points out that “Central India’s forests are home to 35% of India’s tigers…. India’s tiger population is critical—there are just 1,700.” Greenpeace analysed 13 coalfields out of over 40 in central India and found that at risk was “1 million+ hectares of forest… that’s almost twice the area of India’s top 5 metros combined”. Greenpeace estimates that of these, at least 180,000 hectares are inhabited by tigers, 55,900 hectares by elephants and 277,600 hectares by leopards. Also, at least eight tiger reserves will be affected. A minimum

of one third of India—about 33 per cent—should be under forest cover to ensure the natural balance of things. According to the official “State of Forest Report 2013”, “the total forest and tree cover of the country is 78.92 million hectares, which is 24.01 per cent of the geographical area of the country”.

The report claims that there has been an increase of 5,871 sq. km since the 2011 report but also goes on to say that the majority of this has been observed in the open forest category, that is, areas where there is no continuous closed cover of trees. It is a fine point but technically this does not count as forest cover. Much of the country’s forest cover is in central India and a significant part of this is included in the 3,800 sq. km of forest that has been destroyed in the past year. The fate of about 5,000 sq. km more hangs by a slender thread—the MoEFCC may clear a proposal from the Prime Minister’s Office to allow five to 100 hectares of forest land to be used for industrial development.

Pollution index When the BJP came to power, it inherited an ongoing reassessment of the Comprehensive Pollution Index that the UPA government initiated. There was a moratorium on new industries in 43 critically polluted industrial areas. This is a crucial  gauge used in project clearance.

Javadekar’s Ministry interrupted the review and lifted the moratorium on eight key polluted areas, including the notoriously contaminated Vapi in Gujarat and Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh. In August, three months after he entered office, Modi set up a highlevel committee to review environmental laws. The committee’s mandate was to look at the Environment Protection Act of 1986, the Wildlife Protection Act of 1972, the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981. In less than three months, it recommended a dilution of the laws and single window clearances, something that would be welcomed by Corporations.

The committee suggested eliminating all external monitoring of environmental norms and letting companies monitor their own environmental record. In an article in Counterview, an online platform, Ritwick Dutta, Debi Goenka and Himanshu Thakkar debunked the committee’s report, saying it was “prepared in great haste, is replete with factual inaccuracies, wrong and misleading conclusions and the incorrect interpretation of the laws it was meant to review…. The recommendations, if accepted, would dismantle the foundation of environmental rights in India and only lead to an increase in environmental conflicts, and should therefore be rejected in its entirety.”

The final frontier for the BJP’s onslaught on the environment is for the government to strangle the National Green Tribunal (NGT). This body of judicial and expert members views all challenges to environmental clearances before they can go on to the Supreme

Court. Until now, the NGT has not been touched, but given the blatant disregard the BJP  has shown for environmental concerns, any change for the worse would come as no surprise.

Amendments and Bills recently introduced in Parliament

The government has proposed to codify the labour laws, amalgamating several Central Acts. Two codes have been proposed, one on wages and the other on industrial relations. The one on wages amalgamates the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, and the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. The second code is in the form of a draft Bill on industrial relations amalgamating the Trade Union Act, the Industrial Disputes Act and other Standing Order Acts. In the words of a trade union leader, the proposals aim at making the registration of unions almost impossible, barring non-workers from becoming trade union leaders in the organised sector, and declaring illegal all strikes and imposing severe punishment for such strikes.

The proposed amendment to the Factories Act, 1948, has caused considerable concern. The Act prescribes standards for the health, safety and welfare of workers and provides for inspectors to report noncompliance with these standards, which would invite a fine

and imprisonment. The proposal is to replace the term “inspector” with “facilitator”, a person who will give the employer an opportunity to make amends in case of any violation of the law; and if the employer makes amends, there shall be no prosecution. As

one observer put it, “this meek and gentle treatment of offenders is at least half a universe away from fostering respect for the law that is being mooted”.

The Bill to amend the Factories Act, which is pending in Parliament, inserts a new provision, Section 92c, to compound 32 offences by employers, with impact on the health, welfare and wages of workers. The provision says that once compounded “for such amount as prescribed”, “no further proceedings shall be taken against the offender in respect of such offence”.

On May 13, the Union Cabinet approved amendments to the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, allowing the employment of children below 14 years in nonhazardous family enterprises, the entertainment industry and sporting events after school hours. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) criticised the move by saying that using poverty and the “social fabric” of India to justify the use of child labour was tantamount to punishing the child for poverty. The party expressed its concern that it would be impossible to regulate family enterprises and that it would open the floodgates to the rampant use of child labour.

Juvenile justice

Concerns have also been expressed over the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014, which was passed by the Lok Sabha on May 7. The Bill permits juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 to be tried as adults for heinous offences, and for less serious offences, only if apprehended after the age of 21. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child requires all signatory countries to treat every child under the age of 18 as equal. The Bill thus contravenes the convention. It also suffers from legal infirmities as it infringes on the right to equality under Article 14 and Article 21, which require that laws and procedures are fair and reasonable. The Bill also goes against the spirit of Article 20(1) by according a higher penalty for the same offence if the person is apprehended after 21 years of age, even though he may have been a juvenile when he committed the offence. The Bill has been passed by the Lok Sabha although the Standing Committee which examined it cautioned that it was based on misleading data regarding juvenile crimes and violated certain provisions of the Constitution.

Bill to bring back black money

The Undisclosed Foreign Asset and Income (Imposition of Tax) Bill, 2015, is another piece of legislation that secured an easy passage in Parliament in the just concluded Budget session. According to Nigam Nuggehalli, an expert with Azim Premji University, Bangalore, under the provisions of the Bill a person found guilty of wilfully evading taxes can expect to go to jail for a minimum period of three years and a maximum of 10 years. But he has also discovered that the Bill identifies and provides for offences and Prosecutions that have already been accounted for in the Income Tax Act, 1961. To quote him: “It is hard to see what purpose this Bill serves other than to enable the current government to make a political statement that it is tough on black money stashed abroad.... the harshness of criminal sanctions has hardly had any effect on crime in other domains in India. Even in the case of tax evasion, the Income Tax Act already provides for a maximum punishment of seven years imprisonment. Increasing the maximum length of incarceration to 10 years is hardly an innovation.” With the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, already holding the field, the need for another law to deal exclusively with black money stashed abroad is considered superfluous, especially when the Modi government is committed to repealing obsolete and redundant laws.

The legal approach to black money stashed abroad is similar to the amendments the Cabinet approved on April 30 to the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), 1988. The proposed amendments to the PCA provide for classifying corruption as a heinous crime and awarding longer prison terms for both the bribe giver and the bribe taker. The proposal is to increase the minimum sentence of imprisonment from six months to three years and the maximum sentence from five years to seven years. Experts suggest that it is not the toughness of the law but how it is enforced that is the key to its effectiveness. Enhancement of punishment, they say, has often resulted in poor enforcement of laws.

On May 13, the NDA government pushed through a set of regressive amendments to the Whistle Blowers Protection Act in the Lok Sabha despite the “very vocal and well-reasoned objections of the opposition”, as one observer put it. These amendments, according to Venkatesh Nayak, an expert with the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, New Delhi, take away the immunity of whistle blowers from prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (OSA), which is part of the original Act. Secondly, they prohibit a whistleblower from making any complaint about corruption if it relates to any of the grounds mentioned in Section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, which relate to national security, relations with foreign states, trade secrets, intellectual property rights, investigation and prosecution for criminal offences, contempt of court, intelligence informers, trust based relationships such as lawyerclient, doctor patient (fiduciary relationships), Cabinet notes, and privacy of an individual. Thirdly, they prevent the competent authorities from inquiring into any such complaint, and any person from providing assistance to the competent authorities to deal with such complaints. Such amendments have led to widespread resentment among activists.@frontline.in

Acts in haste- NJAC and Constitution of Appointing Judges

Some of the Bills enacted by or pending in Parliament and some in the draft form convey the Modi government’s contempt for norms and disregard for workers and farmers.

IN its first year in office, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government secured the passage of 30 non money Bills in Parliament. While the number of Bills passed in just one year may appear creditable, some of them have the potential to be serious irritants in the future.

The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act and the Constitution 99th Amendment Act are two legislative measures that were passed by Parliament, ratified by the required number of State Assemblies and duly notified after obtaining presidential assent. The Acts have, however, not come into force because the NJAC could not be formed as the Chief Justice of India (CJI), Justice H.L. Dattu, refused to join it. Justice Dattu, an exofficio member of the NJAC, declined to participate in the selection of two eminent persons for the six member commission until the Supreme Court disposed of the petitions challenging the validity of the two Acts.

This stalemated the formation of the commission as the two eminent members have to be selected by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the leader of the single largest opposition party in Parliament, and the CJI. The CJI, two senior judges of the Supreme

Court, and the Union Law Minister are the other members of the NJAC. As the hearing of the petitions challenging the validity of the two Acts before the Supreme Court’s five judge Constitution Bench revealed, the CJI’s refusal to participate in the selection is just one of the several inherent problems in the two Acts that the government did not anticipate during the drafting and passage of the Bills. There was nothing to prevent Justice Dattu from joining the NJAC as the Supreme Court refused to stay the operation of the Acts. The CJI appears to have refused for reasons of propriety: as the head of the judicial family, he did not want to be seen as even remotely influencing the course of the hearing before the bench.

After all, if the bench were to strike down the two Acts for their noncompliance with the basic structure of the Constitution, it is not just the two eminent persons but the CJI himself who would suffer the embarrassment of having been briefly associated with an unconstitutional body to select judges. As the petitioners pointed out several aspects of the Acts that subverted the independence of the judiciary and the basic structure of the Constitution by depriving the judiciary the primacy it enjoyed in the appointment of judges, the government quickly took cover and referred the case to an 11judge bench for “an authoritative pronouncement” on the issue. The thrust of the dispute between the petitioners and the government was whether the judgment of the Supreme Court’s nine judge bench in the Second Judges case (1993), which led to the creation of the collegium to appoint judges, required to be reconsidered as a preliminary issue by a larger bench before the current bench could decide on the validity of the NJAC. The government and other respondents (mainly the BJP ruled States) argued that referral of the case to an 11judge bench was a prerequisite, while the petitioners are opposed to any such referral.

The bench declined the government’s plea for referral and deferred the hearing to June 8.

The government’s handling of the two pieces of legislation exposed another serious crisis: the Constitution was left with no mechanism to appoint judges and even extend the tenures of the Additional Judges in the High Courts as the preexisting collegium system was defunct with the notification of the two Acts and the non-formation of the NJAC. As if this is not enough, the government and the judiciary will face a continuing void in the appointment process as the preexisting collegium system cannot simply spring back to life if the court strikes down the two Acts as unconstitutional. In the event of such a situation, the government may have to introduce a fresh piece of legislation and ensure its passage and notification.

Legal observers blame the Modi government for the lack of diligence in the drafting and passage of the two Acts. According to them, the current crisis could have been averted had the opinion of the Supreme Court been sought—under Article 143 of the Constitution (power of the President to seek the advice of the Supreme Court)—on the validity of the two Bills before they were introduced in Parliament. But if the attitude of the government in the Supreme Court is any indication, it does not seem to be in favour of an early resolution of the crisis. Any delay in adjudicating the challenges to the two Acts will only weaken the judiciary further, with vacancies remaining unfilled.@frontline.in

Links with the West- Modi government in one year

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-nation tour has been significant, with a rich haul of agreements signed, understandings reached, and diverse constituencies touched. By RAJIV BHATIA

PRIME MINISTER NARENDRA MODI’S THREE-nation, nine-day tour (April 9-16) brought remarkable glimpses of Paris, Berlin, Ottawa and several other Western cities into millions of homes in India and around the world. It was an opportunity for the country to see how its government was projecting India in advanced democracies and an occasion for those developed economies to judge for themselves the potential and future trajectory of the world’s largest democracy.

The subtle shift in the portrayal of the Indian economy from a slow-moving elephant to a powerful lion on the prowl (remember the logo of the “Make in India” campaign) is significant. While speaking at the inauguration of the Hannover Fair, Modi thanked the host for “allowing us to unleash our lions in the city”. Media reports on Modi’s tour seemed to highlight defence, the economy and the diaspora as its defining facets respectively in France, Germany and Canada. But, contemporary India practises a multilayered diplomacy that addresses the concerns of various constituencies, ranging from the political to the strategic, business to cultural, and the elite to the common people.

Referring to the big picture, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar observed that the visit’s overarching theme was to deepen cooperation with key members of the G7, the grouping of the world’s most prosperous democracies. They are “relevant” to India’s development programmes and enjoy “political convergence” with it. With the government having already invested much in advancing India’s neighbourhood and “Act East” policy and the relationships with the United States, Russia and China, it was time to focus on other power centres in today’s multipolar world.

France

For long, post-War Europe was managed through a close alliance between France and Germany, but of late, the power balance seems to have tilted in Germany’s favour. Yet, the critical synergy between the impulses and interests of France and India remains unchanged. The strategic partnership, established in 1988, has witnessed significant progress. The importance France attaches to its relations with India was reflected in President Francois Hollande’s visit in 2013 and the visit of Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in mid-2014. Modi’s visit helped showcase and strengthen the multifaceted partnership.

This visit resulted in the signing of 20 memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and agreements. Two issues that had become quite intractable were tackled head-on and resolved, at least partially. For years, the two sides strove to find a way to finalise the deal for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). Agreement on pricing and indigenisation of the aircraft’s production in India had proved elusive. Against this backdrop, an understanding was reached at the government level for the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter planes in “a fly-away condition as quickly as possible”. This arrangement has apparently been made on “better terms” than were offered before. New Delhi has faced some flak for compromising on its “Make in India” policy, but defence experts have justified the agreement as being essential to meet the urgent needs of the

Indian Air Force.

The second issue concerns the setting up of four nuclear power reactors in Jaitapur, Maharashtra. After years of protracted negotiations following the framework agreement of December 2010, the companies concerned—Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and Areva, and Larsen & Toubro and Areva—reached agreements during Modi’s visit, which should pave the way for the project. How much time will be needed to commission the reactors remains unclear. Paris and New Delhi are close partners in the battle against terrorism. In the light of the terrorist attacks on the French weekly Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and the release, in Pakistan, of the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, the two governments articulated their identical approach to counterterrorism.

In a 42-paragaph joint statement, the two governments “reaffirmed” their commitment to the strategic partnership and announced their intention to “consult and support each other”. They spoke of “their independence and strategic autonomy” and stressed that they were committed to continuing their joint efforts to tackle “global challenges”. France voiced its support for India’s candidature for a permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council “without further delay”. They also agreed to commence bilateral dialogue to develop “ways and means of their cooperation in the maritime domain”, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

Significantly, India has welcomed “closer engagement” of France in the affairs of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. The document also spells out the governments’ plans to deepen mutual cooperation in diverse areas: climate change, smart cities, security, space, nuclear energy, the economy, people-to-people contacts, heritage and culture, education, science and technology, sports and health. France would provide a credit line of €1 billion over the next three years for sustainable infrastructure and urban development projects. Agreement was also reached on working together to upgrade the Delhi-Chandigarh railway line to a 200 kmph line and to redevelop Ambala and Ludhiana railway stations.

Germany

At several public appearances and interactions with German business and industry, Modi made a powerful pitch for India as an ideal investment destination. Stressing that there was a natural fit between Germany’s capabilities and India’s needs and expectations, he repeatedly plugged for “a strong partnership between the king of the earth, the lion, and the king of the skies, the eagle”.

India and Germany have been bound together by a strategic partnership since 2001. Heads of state/government have exchanged visits regularly, the last visit being of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Germany in 2013 and of German President Joachim Gauck to India in 2014. Germany is India’s largest trading partner in Europe and the second most important partner in terms of technological collaborations. Bilateral trade was worth over €16 billion in 2013. As an important development cooperation partner and as a country with a long tradition of cultural and academic exchanges, Germany has consistently shown high interest in nurturing its relations with India.

Modi’s visit to Germany concluded with a joint statement, issued in the name of “the Prime Minister of India and the Federal Chancellor of Germany”. They spoke of a common objective to encourage “synergies” between German expertise and new opportunities available in India. “Our strategic partnership is entering a new and more intensive phase,” they noted and agreed on a 10-point list of collaborations in specified areas. Further, they committed themselves to renew their efforts to hold negotiations for “an ambitious” free trade agreement between India and the European Union (E.U.). The two governments would now prepare for the third round of intergovernmental consultations, due to take place during Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit in October.

Canada

The decision to add Canada to the Prime Minister’s itinerary, which in the normal course would have instead included London and Brussels, was innovative. It reflected Modi’s expanding world view. Significantly, he portrayed Canada as “a major Asia-Pacific power” and depicted India-Canada relations as “a natural partnership of shared values”, “an economic partnership of immense mutual benefit”, and “a strategic partnership” that should address “global challenges”. Prime Minister Stephen Harper conveyed, through special gestures such as his decision to travel on Modi’s special aircraft to Toronto and Vancouver, that Canada accorded high importance to its ties with India and to the growing clout of the 1.2- million-strong Indian community in Canada. A senior Canadian diplomat in New Delhi to whom this author spoke referred to Modi’s “rock star status” in North America, stressing that Canada had to wait for 42 years for a stand-alone visit by an Indian Prime Minister.

The visit’s immediate achievements included the signing of the agreement on long-term supply of uranium to India and 13 agreements on skill development. There are indications that the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement may be signed by September. The failure to sign a bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement, however, was “a marked disappointment”. Writing in The Globe and Mail, David Malone, a former Canadian High Commissioner to India, advised Canada to play “the long game” in order “to court India”. He noted: “Canadian capital could help new India’s economic expansion.” Canadians were urged to engage more meaningfully with India.

Glaring omission

A glaring omission in Modi’s Europe tour was the absence of interaction with the E.U. leadership. The fault seems to lie with Brussels, which failed to accommodate New Delhi on the proposed dates. Even so, South Block could have fitted in at least a brief, symbolic visit to the European Parliament or the E.U. Commission to show its respect for the 28 nation grouping. The E.U. may be inward-looking at present, but its significance for India cannot be ignored. Joao Cravinho, E.U. envoy in Delhi, stated that the E.U. could be the biggest source of advanced technology to India and the No. 1 platform to get the country integrated into the global economic chain. Both sides now need to work earnestly to organise the next, much-delayed India- E.U. summit soon.

Modi’s visit has been rich in the haul of agreements signed, understandings reached, diverse constituencies touched, and personal equations made. The image of India as a nation heading towards a positive transformation has been given a big boost. Let us ensure that there is no disconnect between image and reality in the future.

Rajiv Bhatia is director general of the Indian Council of World Affairs. The views expressed here are personal.

Transpacific Partnership: Should India Join this mega trade deal

Whether or not India should join the TPP is a debatable issue. What one can safely conclude is that India’s interest in participation would bring in dynamism to the TPP and be a great relief for both the United States and Japan.

With the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) not quite going anywhere, countries have started moving towards bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) as well as regional trade agreements (RTA). These are seen as a way forward, with trade experts hoping that these will ultimately pave the way for a multilateral agreement in the WTO.

India is negotiating entry into some RTAs, but opinions about them are mixed. Three mega trade agreements are being negotiated: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). India has started preparing for RCEP with its set of demands and offerings but has not taken any stand on the TPP (the TTIP has no relevance because of the geographical area it relates to).

Starting off in 2005 as the Trans Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement (TSEP or P4) between four countries (Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei), the TPP now covers 12 countries – the United States, Canada, Australia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Mexico and Peru getting added along the way – which together account for around 40 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and nearly a fourth of international trade. Taiwan and South Korea are also planning to join.

What is in it for India?

India’s scepticism over FTAs stems from the fact that it has not been able to take full advantage of them as much as its partner countries have. One reason for this could be that India has been silent or slow on economic reforms, as a result of which domestic industries are not efficient enough to compete in the turfs of the partner countries. It is only now that serious efforts have started but they will take some time to show results. However, India can’t wait forever for this process to set in.

India is negotiating an ambitious FTA with the European Union for quite some time now. With India unrelenting on certain areas like government procurement and differences over the automobile sector, these negotiations are not going anywhere. However, the European Union must be desperate for the agreement in view of its domestic economic situation and pressure from its industry which is bereft of any real growth. It all depends on how effectively the policy makers there would be able to convince their varied countries.

As of now, the differences between their economic goals are increasing due to the worsening economic situation in some of the EU member countries. However, instead of embarking on that exercise, that is, convincing its member states about the desperate need to enter into a FTA with India, the European Union is trying to bring down India’s negotiating will by pretending as if it is more interested in the TIPP, which it is now negotiating with the United States and is trying to create barriers such as recent directives on government procurement, so as to send a message to India.

In this backdrop, the best option for India is to simultaneously move on multiple fronts and conclude deals wherever possible, with whatever little gain it can accumulate. This no doubt is a tough call as in any negotiation, we need to give away some to get some. While RCEP and TPP may be competing among themselves, India can’t afford to choose one over the other, leading to a complete neglect of one of the groupings, especially due to the China factor which looms large over RCEP and the fact that, seen from India’s perspective, RCEP may be more about manufacturing sector and TPP about services.

Analyses of TPP

Dr. Badri Narayanan of Purdue University, in a recent paper co-authored with Dr. S.K. Sharma of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade says that India would lose due to TPP, regardless of whether it joins or not. This is because of ‘strong trade diversion effects arising from global price reduction facilitated by widespread tariff elimination’. However, Narayanan adds that India might gain in areas such as textile products, leather, light and heavy manufacturing, fish, dairy, meat/livestock etc., as India’s output would increase if it decides to join the TPP. These are crucial sectors for India because of their employment generation potential.

Narayanan points out that India might, anyway, lose in agriculture as output would decline in sugar, wheat, vegetables, processed food etc. Apart from this, he points out that his study has not taken into account services and hence this study may ‘underestimate the potential effect of liberalization where services sector is to be included’. Thus, this crucial aspect of impact of TPP on the services sector in India is missing in that study making the conclusions incomplete. And it is services sector which need to be looked into carefully with regard to India’s entry into TPP.

There are other analyses with regard to TPP’s impact on other countries. Standard Chartered predicts benefits to Vietnam’s apparels export due to trade diversion from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Dr. Rashmi Banga of UNCTAD predicts further decline in Malaysia’s domestic value added exports due to increase in imports from the United States and Japan. The European Union has already felt that the impact of TPP on it would be negative, forcing it to move faster on its foreign trade agreements with Asian countries.

Hence, we need not shy away from moving towards foreign trade agreements or wait till we put our house in order. This definitely would mean giving away some of our stated positions. That is part of the negotiation. However, the appropriate negotiating strategy is to give away things that would hurt us less or when the offloaded baggage would benefit us in the long run.

India and the contentious areas of TPP

The recent developments in TPP negotiations show that the United States is proposing to make TPP countries its playground. It is trying to expand its ideas of intellectual property rights, trade, entrepreneurship and government procurement to the TPP alliance. Taking lead will have an ‘equal and opposite’ impact on the United States. It would mean that it will have to part with its jobs – mainly in the services sector either voluntarily as a bait or due to the structural compulsions of ‘comparative services advantage’.

It would also mean dilution of its ‘Buy American’ laws, adversely affecting the protection it gives to its domestic manufacturing sector, thereby losing out those jobs to TPP countries. Since much of manufacturing jobs have already moved from the United States, this exodus of remaining jobs in manufacturing and jobs in services sector will greatly affect it. This time, it will not be only the low end ‘white collar coolie’ jobs that will move to other countries, but also lead to an exodus of high end jobs in the services sector as well.

Of all the chapters, the demands on intellectual property rights would be the most contentious. It already is, with economists such as Paul Krugman pointing out that the proposed Intellectual property provisions envisioned by the United States would mainly help the pharmaceutical industry and Hollywood. Krugman has severely criticized the TPP on the ground that, while it may help its corporate giants, the average American worker would lose. Senator Bernie Sanders also argues on similar lines. And this is where India needs to pay attention.

The agreement has 29 chapters and the one on services is of foremost importance to India. The provisions that may cause concerns are the intellectual property rights and agriculture. The agreement aims at comprehensive market access, which means that tariffs and barriers would be eliminated among the member countries for trade in goods and services. It also aims at protecting investments. One problem area for India would be that it will get firmly entrenched in the domain of the United States and the present independence and flexibility it enjoys might be affected if it agrees in toto to the terms and conditions of the TPP, as it exists now.

However, at the same time, America’s agenda in Asia would be ineffective without the participation of the two Asian giants – China and India. With TPP being rumoured to be a tool by the United States to encircle and limit the influence of China’s clout in the region, as part of its ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, and Japan silently playing in the background, India’s interest in participation would bring in dynamism to the TPP and will be a great relief for both the United States and Japan.

India now has an upper hand due to the threat of the other competing mega deal – RCEP which, if made effective, might invalidate any gains that the United States would dream of with the TPP. Hence, it is all the more important that India takes a firm view on this mega deal at this juncture from its present position of strength as it would give it the flexibility to bend the clauses being negotiated. +Swarajya