‘Preparedness is central to the plan’- Disaster Management

India’s role in helping the Nepal government in its relief efforts in the aftermath of the deadly earthquake has come in for a lot of praise. The most important reason for this is the promptness shown by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in handling the emergency well. The NDMA’s work shows that India’s disaster management abilities have evolved much since the 2004 tsunami. Still, experts believe that disaster mitigation and prevention measures already taken are far from satisfactory. Lieutenant-General N.C. Marwah, NDMA member, talks to Frontline about how disaster management functions in the country and explains how it can be improved:

The NDMA’s role in the earthquake relief efforts in Nepal has been widely acclaimed. How prepared is India in the event of a disaster of this scale in near future?

We must understand how the NDMA and the whole disaster management work in India. The NDMA came into being after the National Disaster Management Act of 2005. The Act has comprehensive and elaborate guidelines for all types of disasters. It lays down the responsibilities of government agencies at various levels. The disaster management plan not only means responding to a disaster; it also means mitigation of risks. The NDMA is only a part  of India’s disaster management plans. It focusses on the immediate response to a disaster.

The Act says that all States should have their own disaster management plan. The NDMA, from time to time, recommends fresh disaster management measures for them. Likewise, the States have a district management plan. We have identified five most vulnerable zones with regard to earthquakes and work closely with the States. Risk reduction measures must be central to disaster management planning. We have to think of it when we plan mega-infrastructure or even normal buildings. Various laws and standards have been laid down for infrastructure projects. The States, municipalities and

government agencies are responsible for their implementation. New buildings should conform to new disaster guidelines. It is obvious that disaster management requires a great deal of coordination between the NDMA and various government agencies, with roles cut out for each leg of the plan.

Yes, the Act mentions responsibilities for each level of governance. Disaster preparedness should be a priority. But before everything, the communities in vulnerable zones should be aware about risk-mitigating programmes as they are the first respondents to a disaster. Before the local fire stations, paramilitary forces, NDRF [National Disaster Response Force] elements, home guards, before any official agency. Awareness drives are being undertaken at various levels, sponsored by the Centre and the State governments.

What about mock drills?

Mock exercises touch on all aspects of disaster management—awareness and sensitisation of all the stakeholders and all the governments and non-government agencies that are involved. The NDMA has conducted a total of 486 exercises in various

States with the help of the State governments; of these, 166 focussed on earthquakes in vulnerable zones. Mock exercises include drawing up a plan, ensuring participation of all stakeholders, and drilling it out with them by assuming a disaster situation. We have undertaken three mega mock exercises—in Shillong and Mandi, and on the Bihar-Nepal border. These are high risk zones. These mega exercises went on for a period of time and included awareness drives in schools, hospitals, blocks and panchayats. A drill in the National Capital Region assumed an earthquake with its epicentre at Moradabad in Uttar Pradesh.

The States also have disaster management plans. How do they work with the NDMA?

The State Disaster Management Authority is directly under the supervision of the Chief Minister just as the NDMA is under the Prime Minister. The SDMA should have its own State Disaster Relief Force [SDRF]. We work very closely with each other during disasters. However, most States don’t have a dedicated disaster response force. The States have trained certain units of their police machinery to respond to emergency situations. Battalions in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have been trained in flood management because of the concern over floods. We at the NDMA also have a dedicated team that aims at awareness and capacity building. We train many such battalions. We also train the NDRF commanding officers. And we are aiming at conducting 50 mock exercises in the near future. The NDMA’s role is one of cooperation with the States. The funds fo disaster management now are directly routed to the States through the Finance Commission and not through the NDMA. Municipalities and other such agencies are controlled by the State. We facilitate and help them in undertaking various capacity-building measures.

Experts have felt that while India’s disaster response has evolved into a good system in the post-tsunami period, mitigation and preventive aspects are still inadequate. What do you think are critical concerns as far as disaster management in India is concerned?

Our concerns pertain to the implementation of the plan. After the Nepal earthquake, the overriding concerns across regions is whether the structures people are residing in and working from are safe. What happens if something like Nepal happens here? Particularly in the metros? The parties concerned need to ensure that building rules are followed and implemented. Two days after the Nepal earthquake, newspapers talked about NCR people organising a rapid visual survey [RPS], roping in qualified engineers and architects to inspect high-rises to assess whether they are safe. The rapid visual survey involves identifying vulnerable buildings and then strengthening them to make them earthquake resistant. So the priority right from the State level to the municipality level should be to undertake these surveys and take measures to undertake retro-fitting and, of course, ensure that new structures conform to building norms.

Secondly, we need to have intensive awareness programmes in these vulnerable areas, leading on to capacity building of communities residing there. For capacity building we train civil defence teams in handling disasters. We have already initiated a dialogue with the National Cadet Corps [NCC]. Our teams train NCC boys and girls in their camps. Since the NDMA’s reach is limited, such programmes help us reach much larger audiences. We also train a large number of NGOs [non-governmental organisations].

Do you think the disaster management plan is adequate in handling all disasters effectively?

The structure is fine, but more qualitative interaction between different agencies is  needed. All government agencies should work together.

The role of the NDRF has been widely acclaimed in the last few disasters. How big is the NDRF?

The NDRF today has 10 battalions, and the present government has sanctioned two additional battalions. So we should have 12 battalions, and each unit has about 1,200 people. They are highly trained and equipped with specialised and sophisticated machinery. We often collaborate with international disaster response forces. Our focus is to energise the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Coperation] centre for disaster management in India so that all South Asian countries can cooperate actively in case of a disaster.

The NDRF’s role is acclaimed because of the promptness shown by all departments of the NDMA. The NDMA already has a control room that functions 24X7. In the case of Nepal, we immediately beefed up our staff over here. The Secretary attended a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister. Thereafter the meetings were chaired by Cabinet Secretaries. The NDRF teams are supposed to be ready on a half-an-hour notice. We are happy that our NDRF teams with two or three tonnes of relief materials and essential items to carry were airborne towards Nepal within two hours of the disaster striking. This means they were ready in less than 30 minutes.

Do you believe that environmental violation and indiscriminate industrialisation have led to greater risks of natural disasters?

Yes, these factors are there, but these are the issues that are being specifically dealt with the Ministry of Environment and Forests.

Greater sensitisation about environmental regulations may act as a preventive measure.

Yes. Definitely. When we interact with States, we apprise them of all these issues. The NDMA plays a very active role in engaging with many Ministries too. Environmental issues like violation of Coastal Regulation Zone rules need to be fixed,

and we are aware of that.

The general notion is that when a disaster happens, the NDMA is the only institution answerable. But the NDMA’s focus is disaster response.

You’ve asked a valid question. The buck stops at the National Crisis Management Group [NCMG] under the Act. The chairman of the NCMG is the Cabinet Secretary and there are representatives from all the Ministries in it. The NDMA Secretary is also a part of the group. The Ministry of Home Affairs becomes the nodal Ministry for the response mechanism in case of a disaster.

Published in Frontline,in

Offsets: Evolution and Legal Challenges Affecting its Success

The Indian Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has been under evolution since its first iteration in 2005 and can be best witnessed through the evolution of offsets. The DPP clearly establishes offsets as the desired path to eventually reduce India’s reliance on international vendors and the international political interference which usually accompanies strategic procurement. There are some legal issues, which are creating challenges for the industry and need to be examined.

The evolution of offsets

The 2005 DPP required a vendor to either directly purchase, or provide market access or create new markets for products, components and services from any Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU) or the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) as its offset obligation. It is notable that the term services remained unexplained. The 2005 DPP also allowed foreign direct investment in an Indian PSU for defence industrial infrastructure through equity participation.

The 2006 iteration was a significant step forward which removed the ambiguous concepts of providing market access and creation of new markets and instead provided for vendors to directly purchase or execute export orders for products, components or services from either a DPSU, OFB or any private defence enterprise operating under an industrial license. It also clarified the scope of services to include maintenance, overhaul, up-gradation, life extension, engineering, design, testing, defence related software or quality assurance services; permitted FDI in private Indian defence industries and in organisations engaged in defence research & development and established the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency as a regulator and facilitator for foreign vendors.

The 2008 DPP was a further step forward which introduced the concept of banking of offset credits. The 2011 DPP showed sensitivity to vendor concerns and expanded the list of eligible products to include the categories of homeland security and civil aerospace products. The inclusion was welcome, in light of the continued international concerns with respect to the qualitative aspects of products being manufactured by the Indian industry and the ability of the Indian industry to absorb technology.

Subsequently the Ministry of Defence (MoD) also issued the Offset Revision Guidelines on 1 August 2012. The Guidelines refined certain concepts and were a clear intent of how the Indian MoD wanted to proceed for acquiring key technologies.

The biggest conceptual change which the Guidelines introduced were the introduction of investment in kind. Paragarph 3.1 (c) of the Guidelines explains investment in kind as documentation, training and consultancy required for full transfer of technology (ToT). The Guidelines also explained that investment in kind could also be made by providing machinery and equipment.

The Guidelines were formally incorporated under the DPP with its 2013 iteration. The 2013 DPP took another significant step forward by introducing the concept of multipliers for investments/ purchases from Micro Small Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and transfer of technology to Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO). Subsequently, MoD issued a notification in May 2013 suspending the services component of offset contracts.

The evolution of the philosophy of offset has been closely watched by the world community and while the forward strides in expanding the scope of achieving offset obligations have been welcome, there are significant issues which need to be addressed to make offsets successful. The following section of the article attempts to articulate some of these issues which have both legal and commercial implications for vendors.

Legal challenges affecting the success of the scheme

The present FDI norms only permit investment up to 26%. The restriction has been universally criticized as it gives OEMs restricted operational rights and a disproportionate amount of control to Indian offset partners. The limited equity participation raises significant issues from the OEM perspective on aspects pertaining to quality control, protection of OEMs intellectual property and management issues. While the issue has been actively discussed at various governmental levels, the stasis in implementation continues to be a major stumbling block for OEMs looking to invest in critical technologies.

The discontinuation of investment in the services sector has been a significant backward step. The restriction on services would hit most OEMs who are required to provide simulators, training services and maintenance as part of their contracted obligations. Though no formal rationale for taking the step has been extended by the MoD, the probable reason may have been the abuse of the services route, in which case the emphasis should have been on instilling checks and balances and not an indefinite suspension of the option. Alternatively, the MoD, through Defence Offsets Facilitation Agency (DOFA), could evaluate each investment in services on a case to case basis.

The present regime imposes an obligation on the vendor to adhere to timelines for fulfilling its obligation without imposing responsibilities on the DPSUs to respect the timelines. In the event the delays are caused due to the scope apportioned to the DPSU, the only recourse which would remain with the OEM would be limited to seeking liquidated damages from the DPSU which assuming it agrees to pay, may or may not be sufficient to compensate the OEM for the punitive damages it may be liable to pay under the offset scheme Further, in the event the vendor seeks to enforce damages through courts, the process may derail the entire transaction and cause substantial losses to the OEM’s program.

The issues around transfer of technology are multiple and complex. The DPP places considerable emphasis on transfer of technology. In such a scenario, the valuation of the technology becomes a critical issue. The DPP provides detailed guidelines of the qualitative parameters which constitute transfer of technology, but does not provide any process for valuation of the technology or weightage for how sophisticated it might be.

An argument in favour of MoD’s position, would be that the price at which the goods may be purchased would include the value of technology and hence the same should not be given additional weightage. The authors believe that this is a myopic view. The DPP covers complex multi-year procurements with emphasis on the transfer of core technologies and therefore a weightage needs to be given to the technology a vendor may be willing to transfer. This may also prove to be an incentive to OEMs to bring the latest bleeding edge products to the table.

The present mechanism of technology transfer provides negligible protection to the intellectual property of a vendor. For example, technologies transferred to DRDO can be used by DRDO to build products and freely export them. In case DRDO collaborates with another international defence research & development organization for further refining of the technology, it would result in a vendor losing commercial opportunities in other countries along with the ownership of its intellectual property. This may also lead to a situation where an Indian DPSU may be able to offer the same product to another country cheaper than what the OEM may be able to offer.

In conclusion, it may be submitted that though the policy intention behind offsets remains progressive, there is a need to review it to iron out the various legal concerns and issues. A clear policy and implementation mechanism would help in removing the regulatory and commercial ambiguities and also help the forces to upgrade on schedule. Further, India could also take a leaf from the international practices being followed in other countries such as Australia and South Korea which have significantly gained from offsets by setting up transparent systems and an investor friendly climate. A dithering policy and legal regime would not only increase the procurement cost but would also result in considerable delays and possibilities of disputes in investing in the Indian defence sector.

Editor’s note: The authors represent Khaitan & Co law firm in Defence Practice. Their views may be in line with those of their clients.

US Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces Improved Aviation Safety Rating for India

US Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx has announced that India complies with international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and has been granted a Category 1 rating under the FAA’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) programme. The announcement was made April 8 during a meeting between Secretary Foxx and India’s Minister of Civil Aviation, Ashok Gajapathi Raju

“US and Indian aviation officials have an important, cooperative working relationship,” said Secretary Foxx. “The United States Government commends the Government of India for taking corrective action to address the safety oversight issues identified during the IASA process.”

A Category 1 rating means that the country’s civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards and permits India’s air carriers to add flights to the United States using their own aircraft and carry the code of US carriers on their operations.

This Category 1 rating follows a December 8-12, 2014 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) review, under its International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) programme, of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) of India, subsequent meetings, and an FAA visit to India on March 30-31. On January 14, 2014, the FAA assigned India a Category 2 IASA rating, which signified that India’s civil aviation safety oversight regime did not currently comply with ICAO standards. Under Category 2, the United States continued to work with India’s DGCA while India’s air carriers continued existing service to the United States. However, they were not allowed to establish new services to the United States using their own aircraft.

“Our countries will continue to work together to meet the challenges of ensuring safety in international civil aviation,” said FAA Administrator Michael Huerta. India first achieved a Category 1 rating in August 1997. A December 2012 FAA audit identified some deficiencies in the DGCA from ICAO-set global standards for oversight of aviation safety which led to a Category 2 designation. Subsequently, the FAA began a reassessment of India’s compliance with ICAO standards under the FAA’s IASA programme.

Commented Amber Dubey, India head of aerospace and defence at global consultancy KPMG: "It is a welcome development. Full marks to DGCA, MoCA and the industry stakeholders involved from both India and the US. Given the huge growth expected in Indian aviation and the safety challenges thereof, we can't afford to be complacent. DGCA needs continuous improvement in its systems, processes, manpower, training and transparency. Its financial and operational independence has to be enhanced. It has to improve its transparency and ease of doing business with industry. The industry hopes that the Category 1 upgrade should lead to further reforms.

Notably, FAA assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate, or seek to operate, into the United States, or codeshare with a US air carrier, and makes that information available to the public. The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety oversight standards, not FAA regulations. In order to maintain a Category 1 rating, a country must adhere to the safety oversight standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for international civil aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for government oversight, airports, aircraft operations and maintenance.

A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with the minimum international civil aviation standards, or that its civil aviation authority – the equivalent to the FAA for civil aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas of safety oversight, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping, or inspection procedures and enforcement.

Why military reforms (Part III)

The concluding part of the three parts article scans the maladies of the existing structures and suggests the direction for structural reforms and changes in HRD policies in the military.

Military’s operational planning

In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), operational plans perforce will have to be decided by consensus amongst the service chiefs in an environment where the three services are virtually autonomous, operationally. The resultant outcome is a compromise plan which is a blend of three stand-alone operational procedures of three different services. In the bargain implementation of operational strategies that can provide swift and out of proportion returns would be limited to the extent of compromises obtainable from individual services. Suffice it to say, the fate of country’s defence and security have been abandoned to outcomes of balloting.

Working of the MOD

Since independence, the status of the service headquarters in the structural hierarchy of the Government has remained as attached offices to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) primarily to prevent the military from being included in the Government’s decision making process. This ‘keep them out’ policy has resulted in decisions concerning National Security being decreed by the bureaucrats with virtually no practical knowledge or experience on the subject. Lack of integration of the military into the fold of the MOD has thus created a ‘they’ and ‘we’ divide between these two entities which definitely is not in the interest of the country’s security.

Proposals emanating from service headquarters, including at the level of the Principle Staff Officers are dissected by desk officers in the MOD as a part of bureaucratic scrutiny. With practically no knowledge of the military or war fighting they reverse engineer the process by raising basic and irrelevant queries more to figure out the issue rather than examining the content of the proposal objectively. The process carries on endlessly for months and years frustrating the military besides leaving no time for any other productive work. It is only after those quizzes are responded to, that the correspondences from the military are placed before the addressee bureaucrat. After the proposals are cleared by the ministry, the finance department of the MOD raises its own interrogations often giving an impression that the military is not being trusted.

The MOD and its finance branch are seldom concerned with delays or the urgency of the matter frustrating Service Headquarters. This attitude has caused bitterness and the defence services have come to believe that the bureaucracy is distorting the concept of civilian control of military to bureaucratic hegemony over the services. This belief has gained further credence after the bureaucracy, in a number of cases, had acted in a manner suggestive of its contempt and lack of faith in the Parliamentary Committees and Courts by deciding to re – examine, delay, reject or water down their recommendations and conclusions supporting the services views. Obviously, the bureaucracy has come to assume that they are above the courts and the Parliament of the country. Functionally, the MOD and the service headquarters operating as two different entities have increased bureaucratic hassles and workload, delayed decision making processes adversely, even to the extent of disregarding safety of lives and permanent damage to costly equipment while degrading the standing of the service chiefs in the eyes of their own troops.

Handling military operations related situations

The handling of clashes and standoffs at the borders by the MOD had all along been lackluster exposing professional incompetence which obviously would be the case if those handling live war like situations lack basic minimum military knowledge and practical experience. In one particular instance, the actions of the government gave an impression that a super body outside the MOD had taken control of a standoff situation which ought to have been handled at best at the level of the Joint Secretary in the MOD and by the Brigade or a Divisional Commander in the field provided the people concerned had visualised such situations and had applied their mind earlier. Isn’t it normal and logical to expect such confrontation in the borders under the present prevailing circumstances? 

When incidents which ought to have been anticipated take place, should those responsible to handle the occurrence go silent and allow some other body to get into their shoes? The handling of the situation clearly brings out the panic and lack of self confidence in the minds of the leadership. Or was it lack of trust by the highest political authority in the professional competence and in the ability of those who were meant to handle the issue? The ineptitude and lack of clarity are obvious. To add to the confusion, the command and control arrangements at the troubled spot were anything but what ought to have been. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which controls the paramilitary outfit at the border, appeared to be playing its own song in the midst of a grand orchestra. The MOD, the body which is responsible to handle such situations, provide directions and keep the people informed to assuage their fears and forestall rumour, remained silent giving mixed signals to the country and the adversary alike. In any case does anyone know who was supposed to handle such situations to its logical conclusion?

Restructuring MOD and the military at headquarters formations and units

The Ministry of Defence, Service Headquarters, formations and static headquarters and military units need restructuring as the present structures are not in tune with the requirements of efficiency or modern warfare. The flab in these outfits needs to be cut down to bring about efficiency and make them cost effective and functionally oriented. The systems and procedures in these organisations need review and there is a need to cut down on the clerical staff. Cases will have to be examined directly by the officers, type out their opinion and send them to authorities concerned for further opinion on the net rather than files floating around providing chance for leakages. Once a decision has been arrived it, the file can be stored for future reference. There is a need to restructure various arms, services, the logistic chain and the logistic systems for war fighting after taking into account the combined resources available with the three services and fashion them proportionate to their role. The need to restructure India’s military to meet the changing requirements of modern conditions and warfare is irrefutable.

HRD Policies

Today short command tenures, the need to show results within the short command stints and the ‘zero mistake’ yardsticks that have been developed over the years has not contributed to the development of confident and zealous field commanders. In the bargain troops have been flogged without any meaningful honing of their war fighting skills and junior leaders have not been provided the time and opportunity to train their commands, experiment with tactical situations and handle men in peace as well as in field conditions.

Those in command of troops are bound to make mistakes and things are bound to go wrong when in command. Similarly those involved in developing strategies are bound to take time or bring out philosophies which may not be workable or not to the liking of higher commanders. In the present system such mistakes will ruin the career of individual officers. As a result, with the present Annual Confidential Report (ACR) oriented system, officers prefer to spend maximum time in staff appointments so that there are no risks to their promotion. This time passing bureaucratic attitude is bound to adversely affect the service as a whole. Unfortunately, the system that we have developed over a period of time has cultivated a brand of leadership which places greater emphasis on personal advancement by projecting oneself and his outfit rather than working towards continuity and the good of the defence services as a whole.

All this is the result of the irrationality created by the Third Central Pay Commission, which equated Military and Civil services for Pay and Pensions despite diverse service conditions and terms of retirement. With relative status amongst the civil and military and perks such as travel by air, class of accommodation on temporary duties etc, being linked to pay and the Police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) being permitted to wear military badges of ranks, the race for catching up with the civil and not to lag behind the police and the CAPF began in the defence services in full earnest resulting in unimaginable damage to the very ethos of the Armed Forces. Demand for increase in vacancies in higher ranks, devaluation and proliferation of military ranks, up gradation of existing appointments to higher ranks, senior ranked officers performing duties hitherto performed by junior officers not commensurate with their experience, short command tenures and a wide gap in the rank of commanders and fighting troops are all the result of this ill-conceived idea. The web, into which the government has thus got itself entangled, has brought about a situation where the quest for promotion and equation with civil services will be a never ending phenomenon. Obsession with promotion thus created has affected the ethos of the defence services and has resulted in the declining standards of integrity and moral courage in officers, especially in senior ranks. The demands of the military in terms of vacancies, promotions and increase in pay will be never ending and insatiable.

As a part of military modernisation, areas relating to promotions, appointments, tenures in appointments, retirement ages, postings, foreign and criteria courses and foreign postings in the defence services need to become transparent and beyond favoritism, likes and dislikes of officers in position of power and authority. The system of ACRs needs to become more objective with service interest as the sole criteria. There is a need to lay down a well-defined transparent policy with regard to selection criteria, procedure and appointment of the CDS and Chiefs of Services. The promotion policies of Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks, the promotion criteria, periodicity of promotion boards, channels of approval and time frame for declaring the promotion board results need to be made visible and specified on a rational basis. If and when Joint headquarters come up, issues relating to the selection and promotion criteria for these staff appointments need enunciation besides a system evolved for the promotion of officers in such joint staff. Over a period of time the HR set ups of the three services will have to be amalgamated. The Army, Navy and Air Force Acts need review in the light of changed times. Separate Pay Commission for the Defence Services taking into account their differing conditions of service from other government employees will need to be instituted.

Conclusion

The system of President of India being appointed the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has outlived its utility as the impact or the influence of the President on the government in matters relating to the Armed Forces has been virtually nonexistent. As for the MOD it had been more of a stumbling block in the growth and morale of the Defence Services. The Armed Forces, therefore, need to be made accountable to the Parliament and vice versa. To facilitate Parliament scrutiny as well as its intervention in matters military, there is a need to institutionalise regular interaction between appointed Parliamentary Committees and the CDS as well as the Chiefs of the Services.

As part of restructuring, the role of the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary, the CDS, the Service Chiefs and the Theater Commanders will have to be specified. The areas of jurisdiction and the Chain of reporting within the Defence Services and with the MOD will have to be explicitly laid down. Consequently, suitable mechanisms to enable the CDS to provide advice on matters relating to National Security and the Defence Services directly to the National Security Council (NSC), the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister will have to be worked out. The Deputy to the CDS needs to be slotted in, in the NITI Aayog to get inputs from the Defence Services in Nation building, development and to policies affecting military’s requirements.

To prevent Civil military divide as it exists today, there is a need to delink Order of Precedence and status of Armed Forces personnel from pay scales. A suitable method to enhance the pride of the soldiers and Veterans Community based on their sacrifices will have to be built in. Respect and dignity to soldiers and their families need to be made a norm in the functioning of the Civil Services, including Police especially in rural areas. The lynchpin in the reform process would be the CDS. His selection and tenure, therefore, would need very careful consideration and thought. It would take a minimum of 10 years for the reforms to take some shape from the time the CDS is positioned. If we fail to act now on the issue of modernisation, the defence services will become a liability to the nation very soon, incapable of delivering at the time of need.

Concluded. (blogs.economictimes.com)

Why military reforms (Part II)

The second part of the three parts article deals with the role of modern weapons and equipment in adopting modern concepts of war fighting and the government’s effort to establish a defence industrial base.

Concept of military modernisation

As for the country, most fail to comprehend that military modernisation goes much beyond the realms of acquiring state of the art weapons and equipment. Redesigning higher defence management structures, re-organising the military into a lean, mean and an efficient war machine with appropriate command, control and communication set ups, establishing and grooming structures needed for deriving the maximum out of the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems and evolving HRD policies to maintain the morale and motivation of troops too are essential part of the modernisation exercise.

Upgrading military hardware

Technological innovation and ensuing transformation in weapon systems and equipment revolutionise war doctrines and war fighting techniques. Military structures and organisations adapt themselves to suit war doctrines and the type of war fighting envisaged. India, unfortunately, has remained indifferent to the changes that have taken place in the field of warfare and has been on a static run since independence. The state of the Indian military at present belongs to the days of Field Marshal Montgomery. Products of technological developments such as satellite imageries, drones, unmanned vehicles in the air, sea and land, modern command and control systems, precision warheads capable being launched from almost any platform, cyber and electronic warfare tools have altered the way armies fight. These instruments have a major impact on the operational planning, command and control in a battle and the size and configuration of the defence services. As of today, the defence services do not even have an institutionalised mechanism to harmonise common tri-service issues such as procurement, logistics, training and personnel policies.

The present day military structure, operational concepts and training methods of the Indian Defence Services are built around operations being planned and fought by individual services. Operational concepts are based on mechanized warfare and large-scale ground warfare concentrating primarily on ground combat with Navy and Air Force providing combat support role besides dominating their own domain space. Stuck with a structure which is unsuitable for modern warfare, outdated weapon systems and equipment and a government unwilling to pay heed to the requirements of the military in changed times, the Indian army has had no option but to remain stagnant besides training and preparing for yesterday’s war.

Major portion of the country’s military hardware today are near obsolescent needing immediate replacement. Confusing aims and lack of directions has resulted in shortage of finances for any meaningful defence modernisation in keeping with the changes that are taking place around the world. The clamor for cut in the defence budget from some quarters and the poor state of the country’s social sector has pegged the country’s defence budget ever since India’s independence to around two percent of the GDP. The geo- political environment and the threat to the country’s peace have thus been discounted.

Long borders, resultant large standing army and lack of reforms which probably would have shaped the defence services into a trim and sharp instrument has further compounded the problem leading to bulk of the defence budget being spent on revenue account, leaving very little for the crucial capital account expenditure. The contradiction is, even the meagre funds available for capital expenditure are surrendered unexpended year after year because of a muddled procurement procedure compounded by the Indian bureaucratic attitude and ways. The effect of these procurement hassles has left the military and the country to suffer costs on multiple accounts.

Defence industrial base

One would be astounded to realise that the ‘Defence Industrial Base’ which the government is talking about in relation to its ‘Make in India’ policy already exists in the country with 44 Ordnance Factories (OFs), 9 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and over 50 Defence Research and Development Laboratories under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). These OFs and the DPSUs alone employ a massive workforce of 1,80,044 personnel while the Defence Laboratories employ approximately 30,000 employees including 7,500 scientists. Most of these establishments are non-performing assets considering the size of their workforce and the money being spent on them. These establishments are not relevant today in the context of India’s competent private sector, which is capable of producing much better quality military related stores and equipment than those produced by these government owned set ups.

Low technology infantile defence industrial base, lethargic and outdated ordnance factories still kept running with the sole purpose of retaining the existing work force and a large number of DPSUs, which based on their lackluster performance ought to have been shut down long ago, have all drained public money besides projecting huge eye catching defence expenditure without any meaningful outcomes. Added to it, India’s Defence Industrial policy had kept high technology and

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) out of the scene. Most of the Defence R & D laboratories lack direction, a sense of purpose and effective control besides the finances required to deliver results and in time. With practically no incentives, research and development related to defence equipment has failed to takeoff in the private sector domain.

The role of military in planning

Infrastructure development in the country has a military angle to it. In its present state, the Indian Defence Services present a depressing picture of an organisation incapacitated for moblising troops in a manner that it meets the requirement of security and speed. The problem is compounded in the mountains where switching forces from one sector to the other in time to contain enemy offensive after it has been discerned is a near impossibility. The irony is, even after witnessing a massive dual purpose infrastructure come up across the border, we have not been able to fathom the processes and the coordination that would have gone through between the military, political hierarchy, the bureaucracy, and the financial controllers to achieve what they have been able to, to enhance military capability and to improve the quality of life of those living in their remote border areas simultaneously. 

Across our borders infrastructure such as National highways, airfields communication networks and the like have been located and aligned keeping in mind the requirements of security, surprise and quick mobilisation besides the need to keep multiple military options in executing operational plans. In our case, the erstwhile Planning Commission and the present National Institution for Transforming India Aayog (NITI) has shut the doors for any military involvement in the planning process. This deficiency in our planning processes would negate the advantages that such inputs can provide and would thus affect the quality of decisions which is not in the country’s larger interests.

Continued in Part III: Structural Reforms and Changes in HRD policies for the military. (blogs.economictimes.com)

Why military reforms? (Part I)

 In the first of the three part article the author points to the directionless growth of India’s military. He questions do we know where our military is heading?

If India is forced to go to war with one of its neighbours today, which of the three service chiefs is expected to conceive the war strategy, plan the operations, be in charge of the conduct of war and exercise command and control over the proceedings? What happens if there is no consensus on the war plan? What ensues if one of them wishes to execute the plan differently or has totally different priorities and objectives? In the present state, is the Ministry of Defence (MOD) or the defence secretary in a position to professionally analyse the plan and come out with an integrated blueprint? In an incorporated digitised war scenario would we have the luxury of time to work out a consensus or would the execution be based on the results of voting by the service chiefs? Do we have a combined tri-service structure trained to handle an integrated war? Or are we going to ask each of the chiefs to do what they wish to in accordance with their own plans and hope for the best?

Defence

Ever since India attained independence in 1947, the political class egged on by the bureaucracy favoured a weak, fractured and a restrained military, kept out of the decision making loop. Enhancing the operational capability of the military by altering the existing structures was unacceptable to the status conscious Indian bureaucracy which assumed that losing turf will result in losing control over the military amounting to its degradation. In consequence, the political leadership was made to believe, that keeping the military voiceless, subjecting military’s considered opinion and judgment to bureaucratic scrutiny and controls were the best option to avoid a military coup. The implications of maintaining a weak military to national security were of no concern to the officialdom. As for the country, organisational issues pertaining to the military or for that matter conceptual issues relating military strategy and war fighting seldom evoked any interest amongst the people or the ruling class primarily because of the disconnect between the military and the people that has been created over a period of time. 

The unnecessary secrecy attached to every issue connected with military, though suited some to discard transparency on purpose, helped in further compounding the issue. This has led to India developing a society which is very nearly ignorant of the defence services or its need in relation to its war fighting capabilities. As a result debates in the media as also in the Parliament rarely extend beyond the defence budget, issues relating to pay and perks of the soldiers or some misconduct by some individual of one service or the other.

The present state of the Indian defence forces

There is an anecdote about a conversation in the mid-1930 between the French Prime Minister, Leon Blum, and Charles de Gaulle, then a French Army colonel. The future leader of France reproached Blum about the state of the country’s defenses. Blum was offended. ”But we are spending more for defense than the previous Government!” ”It is what you are spending it

on,” de Gaulle said, ”that I want to discuss.” What they were spending it on was bigness. The French had the largest – and, by most accounts, finest -army in the world. They underwrote huge military budgets. They constructed the most massive defense installation since the Great Wall of China – the Maginot line.

And when World War II came, all of it collapsed. Hit by the German blitzkrieg of 1940, the French would try to seal off a Panzer breakthrough by forming a new defense line 10 miles to the rear – only to find that the Germans had bypassed it already. Twenty, 30, 50 miles back – it made no difference; the Germans were always beyond the new defenses before the

French were ready. The situation continued to deteriorate at an ever-increasing pace, until the French, recognizing their inability to react in time, gave up.

What had happened? In his book ”To Lose a Battle,” Alistair Horne puts his finger on the essential reason. Recognising that, in combat, ideas were as important as weapons, the Germans had overhauled their strategic and tactical doctrines of World War I. The French General Staff, on the other hand, ”allowed itself to become bogged down in bureaucratic method; paperasserie, as the French call it, the blight to which all armies are susceptible, flourished. It was difficult to see where the power of decision lay. … There was not much discussion on a higher strategic and tactical plane, and what there was tended to follow abstractly intellectual paths from which little practical ever emerged.”

Absence of national directives

Indian Army’s state today is something similar. The country has been firing without aiming. Political guidelines in the form of National Security and Defence Strategies are conveniently not spelt out or possibly the powers that be are unable to comprehend what these strategies ought to be. The threat perception has not been enunciated. No one seems to be aware whether the country should be preparing for a two front war while retaining the capability to handle terrorism or if the Government’s assessment is something different. The form of warfare for which the military is required to be structured, equipped and trained has not been specified with each service working based on its own imagination, assumptions and presumptions. The state of indecisiveness possibly brought about by the prevailing ‘palm off the blame’ if something goes wrong attitude, of the Government machinery and the political class is self-defeating.

The result is defence purchases or the priorities for purchases are not based on sound professional logic and requirements. The bureaucracy siting at the MOD are incapable of professionally assessing the requirements or its priorities. Thus the bargaining skills and the personal rapport between individual services and the bureaucracy decide the ultimate laundry list of purchases and their quantity. To put it squarely, military procurement today is unconnected to the needs of network centric joint war strategies or priorities.

Continued in Part II: Modern weapons and equipment change concepts of war fighting (blogs.economictimes.com)