Lack of definition and of transparency governed the entire trip.
Deals were struck behind closed doors,
often to set aside parliamentary laws. By VIJAY PRASHADEMBLEMATIC of the visit of United States
President
Barack Obama to India was the single-file queue of major Indian CEOs
waiting to shake hands with Obama. There
they were: the Ambani brothers, Gautam Adani, Sunil Mittal, Ratan Tata, men
whose names are embossed in gold. Not
often do these CEOs wait their turn. They are known to seize the moment. The
concept of the VVIP—an extra V to
enhance Very—is essentially an Indian term. It is a child of the liberalisation
era. These
are VVIPs. But in the presence of Obama,
they stood patiently in the most orderly queue seen that evening in India.
The bonhomie between Obama and Prime
Minister Narendra Modi set the terms for the media coverage of the visit. This
is a
crucial aspect of contemporary public
relations managers for senior political figures. When Modi went to Australia,
he was
said to be best buddies with Premier
Tony Abbott (the Australian said that Modi is “like a brother”). Personal
connections
are essential to highlight. Hugs and
smiles, easy gestures and affection for each other on Twitter: this sets the
mood for the
visit and governs the superficial media
attention.
Behind the scenes, in the U.S.-India CEO
forum and in the negotiations between the bureaucrats, the real business of
these
trips is worked out. The CEOs complained
about India’s loose adherence to intellectual property laws and worried about
too
much regulation in Indian industrial and
financial law. They longed for a looser regime so that they can, in Modi’s
tortured
phrase, Make in India. “The government
is taking initiatives to ensure ease of doing business,” promised Modi. His
Niti
Aayog chief, Arvind Panagariya, had
written in Foreign Policy (the journal of the U.S.-based Council on
Foreign Relations)
that Indian labour laws would be the
first to be reformed. “Highly rigid labour laws,” he wrote last June, “have
made
entrepreneurs terrified of hiring workers.”
Modi now promises these CEOs that he would lessen their terror. Soon, labour
laws will be eviscerated and investment
will be able to operate untrammelled. Obama agreed, “Modi and I are interested
in
smart regulation.” “Smart regulation”
was left undefined.
The lack of definition and of
transparency governed the entire trip. Deals were struck behind closed doors,
often to set aside
parliamentary laws. In 2010, the Indian
Parliament passed the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, which ensured
that in
the event of any nuclear accident the
liability vested with the suppliers. A year later, a terrible nuclear accident
at
Fukushima, Japan, underlined the wisdom
of such a law. Not only was public confidence shaken by the Fukushima accident,
but also public dismay was raised to
fever pitch when the insurers refused to cover the damages. Inoculation for
private
capital in the event of financial or
industrial disasters has become common—this is what often passes by the name of
“reform”. Profits from these massive
investments are guaranteed, but losses are to be borne by the public exchequer.
“The
deal is done,” announced Foreign
Secretary Sujatha Singh, indicating that the Modi government has been willing
to set aside
the 2010 Act. U.S. firms General Electric
and Westinghouse can comfortably enter, respectively, Kovada (Andhra Pradesh)
and Mithi Virdi (Gujarat) without worry.
The India-Nuclear Insurance Pool, a vague mechanism in case of an accident,
should not provide comfort to those
worried about a disaster.
The Modi government put the word about
that the liability arrangement would put India “in conformity” with the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage (CSC), a 1997 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) framework that essentially shelters
suppliers from liability. Only a handful of states have signed on to the CSC,
whose payout in the event of a disaster is far
less than promised by the IAEA’s Vienna Convention of 1963. The U.S., one of
the signatories to the CSC, has made it clear
that it would not be bound by its dispute resolution mechanism. This being the
30th anniversary of the Bhopal disaster, it
is correct to be watchful about the promises of the U.S. government and
multinational industrial firms, both of whom joined
the Indian government to let down the victims of the 1984 Union Carbide gas
leak.
Down the hall from the pomp of the
dinners and the hushed debates around “Contracting Parties” and “Public
International
Law”, sat the merchants of defence and
the architects of geostrategy. They had two things before them—the push by the
U.S. to draw India into its view of international affairs, and the push to
encourage India to buy U.S. weaponry. Hardeep Singh
Puri, India’s former ambassador to the
United Nations and an adviser to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), wrote that
the
discussions sought convergence related
to “stability and security in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions”. The
undercurrent here is to suborn India
into the narrative of U.S. policy—to “Pivot to Asia”, which is a polite way of
saying to
“Encircle China”. Modi and Obama
released a “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean”,
which poked a
finger in Beijing’s eyes. In the anodyne
language of such statements, it called for maritime security and respect for
the U.N.
Convention on the Laws of the Sea.
What is fascinating about this is that
the U.S. objects to the Convention on the Laws of the Sea on the grounds that
the
protection of seabed exploration and
mining impinges on U.S. strategic interests. Nonetheless, the “Joint Strategic
Vision”
refers to this Convention to assert the
need for peaceful waters, “especially in the South China Sea”. This is a direct
challenge to Beijing. Visits by Modi to Australia
and Japan—two other pillars of the U.S. strategy to build a ring around
China—indicate that India has now drifted into a U.S.
vision of Asian relations. China reacted as it would. The Chinese
Foreign Ministry suggested that such mention of the South China Sea was a provocation. As an influential member of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, China has indicated that it might block India’s membership. The NSG, which controls the
disbursement of nuclear material, was founded in 1974 in reaction to India’s
test of a nuclear weapon. Allowing India into
this group would not only ease access to nuclear materials, but also signal
India’s removal from the nuclear pariah list. In
aggravating China to please the U.S., Modi went some way to undermine his own objectives—namely to move India into the
nuclear power club. India currently straddles two major
international blocs—the U.S.-led alliance and the BRICS community. It is not
going to be easy for the Modi government to balance
the two, especially if the U.S.demands that India make inflammatory statements to affirm the U.S. position on world
affairs (namely on China, Israel and Iran). Despite all the excitement about
economic deals, the U.S. offers little to India apart
from the import of U.S.-made goods into the Indian market. The BRICS bloc
offers far more, including energy security and
mutually beneficial trade. It will not be easy for the Modi government to
navigate these waters, as the Chinese reaction to the
Joint Statement indicates. More caution in foreign policy should be the
watchword.
(Frontline.in)
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